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The issue of how companies in a financially difficult position are to be financed is an 
important but delicate one. The approach to insolvency will undoubtedly require the 
directors to consider whether an extension to existing finance or new finance is an 
option. This consideration is fraught with danger, given that many of the responses 
directors might take, including asset disposals, payment of the most pressing 
demands, enhancing existing or granting further security in favour of creditors as well 
as entering into further funding obligations that may invite creditors to impose 
higher/greater than usual terms as a measure of the heightened risk of lending at the 
insolvency threshold, may well attract the use of transactional avoidance measures 
known to most insolvency systems. As an added peril, to continue trading while 
within sight of the moment of formal insolvency may also attract the application of 
wrongful or insolvent trading rules, also a feature of many developed legal systems. 
General misfeasance, of which the above may be particular illustrations, may also 
attract liability. The justification for the rules dealing with the avoidance of 
transactions, wrongful trading and misfeasance (more generally) is that continued 
trading and transacting may have a disadvantageous impact on the position of 
creditors overall. Thus, directors are to be encouraged to seek help at the earliest 
opportunity, by engaging turnaround, pre-insolvency and insolvency measures, 
whichever may be appropriate. Thus, they can avoid exposure to liability and the 
chances of litigation being brought by an insolvency office-holder keen to ensure that 
the estate is restored to the position it ought to have been in had these transactions not 
taken place. 
In classic insolvency, the above measures generally do not invite consideration of 
the creditor’s position, except as perhaps a party from whom property (or its value) 
may be recovered if transactions of a claw-back type have taken place to their benefit 
and any incidental liability this may incur so as to restore the estate. It is less usual to 
discuss, in situations where financing is obtained, whether the creditors in those 
instances are exposed to risks other than those usually attendant on lending 
transactions: the possibility that their lending decision may have a detrimental impact 
on the position of other creditors by increasing the level of indebtedness to one 
creditor, which, with concomitant security, will put that creditor at a manifest 
advantage when compared to others. In many legal systems, lenders will have no 
liability provided they lend prudently and in line with rules set by those regulatory 
and oversight bodies that may exist or generally accepted canons of banking 
prevailing in the jurisdiction. However, the notion of when it may be prudent as 
opposed to otherwise will usually take place, just like the examination of when 
wrongful trading has occurred, on the basis of an ex post facto analysis. A court may 
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well re-qualify the lending transaction as imprudent, resulting in that creditor perhaps 
losing the benefit of any advantage or priority gained through security. Exceptionally, 
a court may decide that the extent of the lending decision goes beyond the merely 
imprudent and acquires overtones of negligence or wilful behaviour, leading to 
possible liability to the debtor’s estate or other creditors. This view of a general 
liability for creditors arising out of the lending arrangement, as opposed to a specific 
liability in particularly targeted instances (usually on grounds of public policy), is not 
a universal one. 
It is the intention in this article to look at two contrasting approaches to creditor 
liability, that in France, where a generalised principle exists, albeit attenuated by 
insolvency law reforms in the mid-2000s, and that in the United Kingdom, where 
contractual freedom and a robust lending culture have given less room for the 
development of creditor liability rules except in very limited and carefully crafted 
instances. 
 
2  France1 
In France, the developed doctrine of “improper support” (soutien abusif) has resulted 
in lenders being potentially subject to sanctions, particularly if the lender’s behaviour 
is deemed to have contributed to the insolvency of the debtor. This would usually only 
occur where the lender gave or extended credit, which was beyond the capacity of the 
debtor to handle appropriately, thus leading to an aggravation of its financial 
problems. In addition, lenders could face sanctions if their participation in the 
financing of a business or other close connexion resulted in their becoming closely 
enmeshed in the activities of the debtor with the consequent acquisition of the status 
of a de facto or shadow director. These latter sanctions still remain as a possibility in 
insolvency, but the doctrine of improper support saw considerable limitations placed 
upon its use in 2005. These occurred as an incidental by-product of the reforms to the 
framework for insolvency law in France that saw the introduction of the 
“preservation” (sauvegarde) procedure in that year.2 As of 1 January 2006, the date 
this new regime came into force, the general landscape of French insolvency law saw 
some fundamental changes in the shape of the procedures which were available, 
including in relation to lender liability. Minor amendments were made in 2008, as part 
of a further tranche of reforms, but which have not radically altered the impact of 
these provisions.3 
 
2.1  Soutien abusif: the traditional position 
The doctrine is said to have its roots in case-law developed in the mid-1970s by the 
commercial chamber of the cour de cassation, particularly the Arrêt Laroche on 7 
January 1976, and based more generally on the tort liability provisions of the Civil 
Code.4 Under the law of 1985,5 the text that governed insolvency law from 1986 until 
consolidated within a reinvigorated Commercial Code in 2000, the principle derived 
from that case and from a later judgment of the same chamber on 16 November 1996 
clearly established the application of lender liability to the then new regime for 
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insolvency procedures.6 As the doctrine was developed, a lender would normally be 
liable to the insolvent estate if it knowingly supplied credit to a business that was in a 
“compromised situation” (situation compromise).7 Liability could also result from the 
failure to supervise the use to which the credit was put where this was a condition 
attached to the supply of credit, often found in the form of a clause in contracts 
applicable to most banking services and overdrafts.8 Using the same tort provisions, a 
lender could become liable to a third party, for example a guarantor whose guarantee 
was subsequently called in as a result of the debtor’s failure. The principle established 
by the case-law could also extend to suppliers of goods and services as well as mutual 
insurance organisations whose remit is normally to support their membership with 
loans during times of need.9  
The action against the lender at fault would normally be brought by the creditors’ 
representative, the official in insolvency proceedings appointed to conduct the 
verification and admission of claims.10 Proof of whether a lender was aware of the 
debtor’s financial situation needed to be brought by the party making the allegation.11 
Indeed, in many instances, those alleging fault needed to prove that the lender had 
information available to it that the directors of the debtor business did not know at the 
time they entered into the loan arrangements.12 It was nevertheless open to the judges 
hearing the case to make a finding that, given the state of facts and evidence, the 
lender was to be regarded as being perfectly aware of the debtor being in a perilous 
situation.13 
A link between the fault attributable to the lender and the insolvency also needed to 
be shown.14 Where the granting of credit could be deemed unlawful and/or 
accompanied by strategies designed to solely benefit the creditor and not to properly 
serve the needs of reconstructing a business, then liability was clear.15 However, a 
creditor could not be held liable for any of the consequences of the granting of credit, 
unless one of the exceptions (detailed below) was found, unless the circumstances in 
which the credit was granted revealed a fault in relation to the loan (concours fautif).16 
Furthermore, if the insolvency was shown to result from the actions of a third party, 
such as one of the company’s debtors failing to make payment, or if the lender’s 
contribution to the insolvency was negligible, then the lender would escape liability.17  
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8 Cassation commerciale 18 May 1993 Bull Civ IV No 190. 
9 Lafortune (n 6) 16, citing Cassation commerciale 30 Oct 2000 Bull Civ IV No 170 and Cassation 
commerciale 10 Dec 2003 Bull Civ IV No 199. 
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11 Cassation commerciale, RJDA 3/92 No. 237. 
12 Lafortune (n 6) 16-17, citing Cassation commerciale 11 May 1999 Bull Civ IV No 95, Cassation 
commerciale 26 March 2002 Bull Civ IV No 57 and Cassation commerciale, 24 Sept 2003 Bull Civ IV 
No 137. 
13 Cassation commerciale 1 Febr 1994 Bull Civ IV No 39. 
14 Cassation commerciale 24 March 1992, JCP éd E 1993 pan240. 
15 CA Orleans, 13 Jan 2011 Rev Proc Coll 2011 no 205. 
16 Cassation commerciale 27 March 2012 D 2012 1455. 
17 Cassation commerciale 2 May 1983 D 1984 IR 89. 
 4 
 
In any event, the lender could raise several defences to an allegation of improper 
support. The lender could allege that it was not properly informed or entitled to be 
informed of the situation in which the debtor was to be found. This tended to be the 
claim most often made where the lender wished to avoid any accusation of being 
involved in the management of the company, for which liability could also be found 
under the sanctions provisions of the law of 1985. Nevertheless, courts tended to hold 
that lenders were required to be vigilant and liability could attach where it was held 
that it would be reasonable to presume that the bank could not have been unaware of 
the situation.18 Similarly, it could also be held that the bank had the necessary 
information or means at its disposal and ought to have made enquiries, in default of 
which liability would attach.19  
A lender could also allege that there was sufficient backing for the company by the 
public authorities which did not lead the lender to assume that the situation was 
irremediably compromised. This was especially the case where the business in 
question was known to be considered by the authorities to have public importance or 
be vital for the economic well-being of particular communities, when public subsidies 
or other support could be forthcoming. In this event, a lender would not necessarily 
have any reason not to continue furnishing credit and a lender in this position might 
have no option than to participate in a rescue plan organised as part of insolvency 
proceedings.20 Inevitably, given the political interests behind much of French 
business, where pressure might be brought to bear on lenders to ease restrictions on 
credit, allegations of this type would usually surface in insolvency proceedings as a 
defence to a claim of improper support. 
Beyond the defences available, the consequences of liability tended to be harsh. If 
found liable, the contribution of the lender was usually deemed equal to the difference 
between the results of the insolvency proceedings in the instant case and what they 
would have been if the lender had not contributed to artificially prolonging the life of 
the company. In fact, the provision of excess credit or means of finance which only 
serves to further indebt the business will normally fall under the heading of improper 
support.21 This was a constant theme in the case-law, with a later case defining the 
liability in terms of “the worsening of the deficiency in assets the [lender] contributed 
to creating”.22  
In general terms, there could be two distinct contributions that the lender was 
required to make. Firstly, it could be required to contribute to the collective loss 
suffered by all the creditors. Secondly, it could be required to meet any individual 
claims arising from losses individual creditors suffered. The collective loss was 
defined to be worth the value of the difference between the value of the declared debts 
and the dividends payable as a result of the procedure. The courts also held that this 
included any depreciation on the debts suffered by the creditors and any loss of 
interest.23 Individual loss was defined to exclude the direct loss attributable to the 
insolvency, but did include commercial losses suffered by the loss of a trading partner 
and future profits.24 Nonetheless, the liability was not open-ended and, in order to 
                                                          
18 Cassation commerciale 22 July 1980 Bull Civ IV No 317. 
19 Cassation commerciale 18 Jan 1994 BRDA 94-4 p10. 
20 Cassation commerciale, 9 Nov 1993, Bull Civ IV No. 384. 
21 Cassation commerciale, 11 Oct 1994 D 1994 IR 240. 
22 Lafortune (n 6) 17, quoting from Cassation commerciale, 22 March 2005, Bull Civ IV No 67. 
23 Cassation commerciale, 25 Nov 1986, D 1987 jur 88. 
24 Cassation commerciale, 15 July 1982, Bull Civ IV No 233. 
 5 
establish what the lender’s contribution would be, proof of causation needed to be 
brought, a factor that usually tended to limit or qualify the losses. However, the 
position of lenders and creditors generally in the event of their debtor’s insolvency 
was uncertain and many high-profile rescues proved worrisome for the lenders 
concerned. 
 
2.2 The reform initiative and post-reform position 
The events leading up to the general reforms to insolvency law and practice in France 
in 2005 have been chronicled elsewhere.25 In summary, a new procedure in the shape 
of anticipatory rescue proceedings was created called preservation (sauvegarde), the 
existing procedures of judicial rescue and liquidation surviving with the processes 
much tightened up and time limits accelerated, while the pre-insolvency procedure 
called “friendly settlement” (règlement amiable) was revised and renamed 
“conciliation” (conciliation). One of the chief innovations in the text was to extend 
the overall time limit for the declaration of insolvency to 45 days (from the previous 
15), within which conciliation remained available to debtors alongside the more 
formal rescue procedures. Preservation, however, would not be available after the 
moment of formal insolvency. Insolvency procedures were also made available to 
debtors not previously covered by the legislation, mostly debtors of professional 
standing, while the sanctions regime was reviewed with many penalties deemed 
incompatible with preservation and restricted to being used in the context of judicial 
rescue and/or liquidation. This would be the case of the vulnerable transaction rules, 
which would only apply to judicial rescue procedures.26 
In the revised sanctions section, the law of 2005 also addressed the issue of 
improper support. In the Explanatory Memorandum accompanying the draft 
introduced into parliament, the reasoning used to justify this change was that the 
information provided to all parties for the purposes of negotiating an agreement in 
conciliation or a rescue plan (in preservation or judicial rescue) puts all creditors in 
the best negotiating position possible. It would thus be unreasonable to allow the 
creditors to invoke a right to pursue a fellow creditor on the basis that previous 
financing arrangements seemed to give a misleading impression of the debtor’s 
financial status.27  
The law of 2005 thus introduced a new article limiting liability for any supply of 
credit, except in cases of fraud, deliberate interference in the management of the 
debtor company as well as where any guarantees acquired by the creditor are deemed 
disproportionate to the credit supplied. One of the consequences of liability being 
established was that any guarantees would be deemed void.28 The 2008 amendments 
altered this statement to allow for the reduction of the amounts of the guarantees as an 
alternative to their being declared void. The passage of the 2005 provision through 
parliament was not, however, entirely without incident. The provision in fact began as a 
limited reform in the context of conciliation proceedings in order to protect the position 
                                                          
25 See Omar “Reforms to the framework of insolvency law and practice in France: 1996-2006” ch 6 in 
Broc and Parry (eds) Corporate Rescue: An Overview of Recent Developments (2006) 111-150; Omar 
“French insolvency law: the 2004 draft law and reform perspectives” 2005 ICR 65; Omar “French 
insolvency law and the 2005 reforms” 2005 ICCLR 490. For reforms subsequent to 2005, see Omar 
“French insolvency law: remodelling the reforms of 2005” 2009 ICCLR 225; Omar “Preservation and 
pre-packs à la Française: the evolution of French insolvency law after 2005” 2011 ICCLR 258; Omar 
“Tinkering at the edges: insolvency law reforms in France (again!)” 2014 ICCLR (forthcoming). 
26 In articles L. 632-1 and 632-2, Commercial Code. 
27 Exposé des Motifs 5-6. 
28 a 126 Law of 2005, introducing a new a L 650-1, Commercial Code. 
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of creditors offering post-commencement financing.29 By the time of the final draft, 
what was then article 142bis contained the elements seen in the completed reforms, 
while the post-commencement financing provision was dealt with elsewhere in the text. 
Nonetheless, neither set of provisions met with the entire approval of parliament. By 
way of example, amendments were tabled in the senate seeking to remove the provision 
dealing with improper support entirely on grounds that the text privileged the interests 
of lenders above all others, particularly given the fact it formed an unacceptable 
limitation on the general legal principle of liability as well as the “derisory [sanctions] 
in light of the profits amassed by banks”.30  
The rapporteur’s objection in response stated the purpose of the provision as 
clarifying the proper extent of liability due to the uncertain state of the case-law on the 
matter. The then Garde des Sceaux,31 Clement, was particularly incensed by the 
amendment, given the government’s view that defining the scope of improper support 
would make it easier to avoid lenders refusing credit in rescue situations.  
The measure ultimately passed, becoming part of the law of 2005 on 13 July 2005. 
However, this was not the end of the matter. Under the French constitution, members of 
parliament have the right to refer texts to the constitutional court to decide whether the 
provisions are compatible with the constitution and sacrosanct principles of French law, 
often called constitutional values (valeurs constitutionnelles). The reference on 14 July 
2005 invited the court to declare on the improper support provision as well as that 
governing the protection of post-commencement financing.32 The constitutional court 
was not convinced by the reference, which based itself on the possibility of breaches of 
the principle of equality of treatment at the heart of the French constitution.33 The court 
stated, referring to the protection for post-commencement financing, that creditors who 
took the risk of providing fresh funds during insolvency are in very much a different 
position to pre-insolvency creditors waiving or deferring debt and are not to be taken, 
despite the possibility of laying off risk through insurance or syndication of loans, to be 
as a result of the provision in a better position than other creditors. Therefore, there was 
no breach of the equality of treatment principle.34  
As for the limitation of liability for improper support, the court was not convinced by 
the argument that lenders were thus made exempt from responsibility in breach of 
general tort principles and article 4 of the Declaration of the Rights of Man and the 
Citizen 1789,35 holding that the text as drafted in fact clearly enunciated the cases in 
which liability still remained and that the clarification of the law allowed for an obstacle 
preventing lenders from assisting in the debtor’s rescue to be lifted, thus satisfying the 
objective of general public interest. In any event, the court stated that lenders sought to 
be made liable had the option to provide evidence to the contrary and to appeal any 
adverse finding, thus preserving the parity of all parties in proceedings. As a result of 
the court’s decision, the way was prepared for the law of 2005 to be finally adopted on 
26 July 2005 and promulgated the next day. 
 
2.3 The exceptions to the presumption of non-liability 
                                                          
29 a  8 of the Assemblée Nationale draft no 1596. 
30 See comment by Mme Assassi speaking to the amendment in the Senate on 30 June 2005, 
www.senat.fr/cra/s20050630/s20050630H95.html (3-05-2014). 
31 Lit “Keeper of the seals”, the official title of the minister of justice. 
32 a 8 law of 2005, amending the renumbered a 611-11 of the Commercial Code. 
33 Possibly analogous to the pari passu principle familiar to insolvency law. 
34 See the constitutional court’s decision no 2005-522 DC of 22 July 2005, published in the Official 
Journal of the same date. 
35 This text states: “Liberty consists of being able to do all that does not harm another.” 
 7 
The law of 2005 changes raise a presumption of non-liability, subject to three stated 
exceptions. The fact that the text was drafted in this way was of interest to 
commentators studying the text who termed the provision a “partial professional 
immunity”36 and a “principle of non-liability”.37 What was also of interest was that 
the text did not distinguish between debts arising prior to or after the opening of 
proceedings, nor was it limited in its application to any one or more of the various 
procedures available, giving it a universal vocation. Furthermore, the exemption from 
liability protected creditors from possible claims by any of the parties usually 
involved in this type of claim, whether the debtor itself, other creditors or guarantors 
for the debtor’s obligations.38 Nonetheless, the scope of the exceptions remained to be 
determined and there could be difficulties in interpreting the extent of the liability in 
certain instances of lender behaviour. Hence, the utility of the case law in fleshing out 
some of its parameters. 
 
2.3.1 The fraud exception 
Fraud is deemed to take place in circumstances where, under the general law, an act is 
fraudulent in nature or is accomplished in the context of acts that could give rise to a 
criminal charge. Examples of general law offences that would raise a presumption of 
fraud or fraudulent intent include defrauding customers or contractual partners, tax 
evasion, smuggling and the illicit trafficking of substances.39 Nonetheless, in the 
immediate context of insolvency, there are a number of specific situations that could 
give rise to an allegation of fraudulent behaviour. The transactional avoidance 
provisions,40 which after the law of 2005 apply only to the situation of judicial rescue 
and liquidation proceedings, forbid acts involving the transfer without consideration of 
the debtor’s property, the entry by the debtor into obligations resulting in a manifest and 
disproportionate burden (as might be the case of security), the payment of debts that 
have not yet fallen due, the payment of debts already falling due by unauthorised means 
(principally payments in kind and non-exempt instruments), the sequestration of funds 
made in pursuance of a guarantee, the creation and enforcement of security, the exercise 
of options to acquire shares/stock as well as the constitution of trust funds (patrimoine 
de fiducie) and alteration of trust instruments.  
All of these transactions will be void if made after the date of cessation of payments, 
while property transfers made without consideration within the six months prior to this 
date may also be annulled.41 Furthermore, payments for debts arising post-
commencement and burdensome contracts entered into by the debtor after the date of 
cessation of payments may be avoided where it is proved the other party knew of the 
cessation of payments.42 Although, following the adoption of the law of 1985, 
preferential payments to creditors no longer constitute an offence punishable by 
criminal law,43 behaviour by lenders seeking to maximise their position may fall foul of 
any of these provisions and raise a presumption of fraud in addition to any civil liability 
engaged as a result. 
                                                          
36 Lafortune, above note 7, at 17. 
37 See Legeais Les concours consentis à une enterprise en difficultés JCP éd. E (2005) 1747. 
Commentary generally on the scope and extent of the provision has been sparse, but relatively 
consistent over the years. 
38 Legeais (n 37) 1747-1748. 
39 Lafortune (n 6) 19. 
40 a L 632-1 and L. 632-2, Commercial Code. 
41 Ibid a L. 632-1. 
42 Ibid a L. 632-2. 
43 Cassation criminelle, 21 June 1993, Petites Affiches, 26 Jan 1994, 20. 
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Fraud would also be an issue where a lender is deemed complicit in the activities of 
the debtor that are susceptible to a charge of criminal bankruptcy, which exposes the 
author of the act to five years imprisonment and a fine of €75 000.44 The types of 
activity include, in the event of judicial administration or liquidation proceedings being 
instituted, raising funds by ruinous means, such as through the sale of assets at 
undervalue in order to delay the onset of insolvency, diverting or dissimulating assets 
belonging to the debtor, fraudulently increasing the debt owed by the debtor and 
falsifying, destroying or failing to keep those accounts required by law.45 In one 
instance, ruinous means was interpreted as covering the case of a lender who was found 
guilty of abetting the act of criminal bankruptcy by providing excess credit.46 Where a 
court noted that a banker had written to the company director forbidding the issue of 
any more cheques on the company account, but had let the director move moneys to his 
personal account and write cheques from that account, the banker could be found guilty 
of being an accomplice.47 
Furthermore, within the context of criminal proceedings, a court has stated that 
normal credit can be deemed excessive where it is considered to go beyond the 
reasonable needs of the business.48 One of the issues here will be the extent to which the 
fraudulent intention can be attributed to the knowledge of a possible harm to the 
interests of other creditors and it is possible that a wide interpretation by the courts of 
the concept of fraud could undermine the impact of the presumption of non-liability.49 It 
seems, however, that the courts require more than simple negligence, such as by 
permitting a doubtful promissory note to be discounted, especially where there were no 
suspicions that the activities of the debtor were otherwise than normal.50 Actual 
knowledge, proved to the standard required for a criminal offence, of the fact that the 
debtor was in cessation of payments and wished to delay the filing of proceedings by 
means of acquiring further funds that were ruinous (ruineux) because excessive as well 
as the banker’s conscious decision to associate himself with the debtor’s activities 
would be required to engender liability.51 
Other activities giving rise to a presumption of fraud could include the concealment 
or dissimulation of all or part of the assets belonging to the debtor in the interests of 
any of its directors and the fraudulent submission within preservation, judicial rescue 
or judicial liquidation proceedings of debts alleged to be owed, all of which would 
attract the same penalties as for criminal bankruptcy.52 A lender may also be liable to 
a penalty of two years imprisonment and a fine of €30 000 for agreeing to the 
payment of any debt or constitution of security by the debtor during the observation 
period of preservation or judicial rescue proceedings without the consent of the 
supervising judge or receiving the payment of a debt made in breach of any 
                                                          
44 a L 654-3, Commercial Code. The penalties are increased by a L 654-4 in the case of a principal or 
accomplice who is a manager of a business that offers investment services to seven years imprisonment 
and a fine of €100 000. There is also a range of supplementary penalties contained in a L 654-5, 
including the loss of civic rights and exclusion from the profession or business in whose exercise the 
offence was committed. 
45 a L 654-2. This provision contains elements in common with a L 653-5. 
46 Cassation criminelle, 3 April 1991, JCP éd E 1992.I.154.11. 
47 Cassation criminelle, 9 Oct 1989, D 1990 somm 120. 
48 Cassation criminelle, 30 Oct 1989, JCP éd E 1991 pan 65. 
49 Legeais (n 37) 1748. 
50 Cassation criminelle, 13 Nov 1989, Rev Proc Coll 1990.287. 
51 CA Paris, 14 Febr 2000, D.2002.somm.205. 
52 a L 654-9, Commercial Code. 
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prohibition during the same proceedings or outside the terms of a preservation or 
rescue plan as well as agreeing to the alienation of any property deemed inalienable 
for the purposes of a sales plan.53 Lastly, agreement by a creditor to a contract 
carrying a special advantage whose burden is borne solely by the debtor, which would 
also cover the position of security and other possible advantages, will attract the 
possible avoidance of the contract and the penalties set out in article 314-1 of the 
Penal Code.54 In all of these situations, it might be difficult for a creditor to resist the 
allegation of intention to commit fraud where the constituent elements of any of the 
offences are proved. 
 
2.3.2 The “interference” (immixtion) in management exception 
Instances where the relationship between debtor and lender goes beyond normal 
commercial relations, as can arise by the development of close ties through the supply 
of goods and credit, will give rise to questions of whether the dependency and close 
management relations that may be a result will characterise the lender as part of the 
debtor’s management with the consequence that the lender acquires the status of a 
director. Once this status is established, the full panoply of the sanctions regime is in 
theory available, although the application of certain civil and criminal liability 
provisions will depend on which type of insolvency proceedings are initiated, 
sanctions and the preservation process being deemed incompatible. Normally, where a 
lender accepts appointment, for example under a corporate debtor’s articles of 
association as a de jure director (dirigeant de droit), the unsurprising consequence is 
that the lender will, in common with all other directors, be liable for acts committed 
during the period of office.55 Although the practice may be uncommon in France, the 
Law of 1985 certainly facilitated the possibility of appointments of lenders because it 
relaxed the automatic presumptions of causation and liability in previous insolvency 
legislation.56 However, the type of participation in management that is the focus of 
this provision is the unwarranted interference in the debtor’s capacity to decide 
business matters, a fact that will place the lender in the position of being treated in law 
as a shadow or de facto director (dirigeant de fait). 
An individual will enjoy the status of a shadow director where he exercises the 
powers of a director regularly or in the absence of the directors or where he represents 
to third parties that he is a director to the extent that he is able to make financial and 
commercial decisions which bind the company. This may also occur where the 
individual exercises influence on the directors so that they act in accordance with his 
instructions.57 Incorporated entities, such as companies and most financial lenders, 
which satisfy the above conditions will also be treated as having the status of a shadow 
director, in which case it may be held jointly and severally liable with the representative 
it appoints to the debtor’s management board for the consequences of interference with 
the management of the insolvent debtor.58 Close economic dependence, which is often 
the case in groups and may be characterised by generous or exclusive dependence on a 
unique source for credit facilities may result in liability for a lender in this position if it 
plays an important role in management decisions.59  
                                                          
53 Ibid., a L 654-8. 
54 Ibid., a L 654-13. 
55 Cassation commerciale, 24 Jan 1983, RJ Com. 1984.215. 
56 Comment made in the compendium Lamy droit du financement (1995 ed) par 2678. 
57 CA Versailles, 20 Jan 1994, RJDA 94-4 no 461. 
58 TC Paris, 5 Jan 1994, RJDA 94-4, no.456. 
59 CA Aix-en-Provence, 26 May 1981, D.1983.IR.60. 
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A lender which, although not a de jure director, delegated one of its members of staff 
to permanently advise a debtor, was held liable where this member of staff took part in 
management decisions.60 The question of fictional companies and common purpose has 
also been the subject of much case-law and debate on the circumstances in which 
piercing the corporate veil is permitted.61 Identity of management and pursuit of 
common aims or commercial activity are key factors in assessing the reality of separate 
company identity. Companies which share a common manager may find that 
insolvency proceedings involving one company may be extended to all companies thus 
associated.62 If a debtor and lender share one or more directors, there may be a question 
of whether the personal link is strong enough to have influenced the debtor’s decisions, 
an affirmative answer naturally exposing the lender to liability. 
The finding that a lender has interfered in the debtor’s management may have 
consequences beyond a finding of improper support. Title V of Book VI of the 
Commercial Code set out a wide range of sanctions in the context of insolvency 
matters. These include liability for a deficiency of assets revealed as a result of the 
termination of a preservation or judicial rescue plan or the liquidation of a corporate 
debtor, which will entitle the court to decide that the debts will be borne by some or 
all of the de jure or de facto directors who have contributed to the management fault 
that is at the root of the deficiency arising.63 Personal bankruptcy is also an option 
open where the above allegations are proved.64 It is also available where a different 
set of constitutive facts are operative, including where ruinous means are used to 
procure funds with the intention of avoiding or delaying the opening of judicial 
administration or liquidation proceedings, where obligations are subscribed to that are 
disproportionate to the needs of the debtor having regard to the situation the debtor 
was in, where payment to a creditor is authorised after cessation of payments and in 
knowledge of the cause of this, to the prejudice of other creditors, where voluntarily 
abstaining from co-operating with those responsible for proceedings forms an obstacle 
to its progress and where accounts are fictitious, manifestly incomplete, irregular or 
missing.65 Subsidiary penalties where personal bankruptcy is ordered may include a 
prohibition from standing for public office.66 Nevertheless, as an alternative to 
personal bankruptcy, a court may order disqualification from being involved in 
business or the management activities.67 Finally, conviction for criminal bankruptcy, 
in much the same circumstances as those outlined above in the section on the fraud 
exception and the lender’s complicity in the debtor’s activities, may also apply to 
lenders or their representatives who take on the status of de jure or de facto directors. 
 
2.3.3 The disproportionate guarantees/security exception 
The issue of how disproportionate a guarantee has to be before it is caught by this 
exception to the presumption of non-liability is one that some say affords the judges 
the widest scope for judicial decision-making.68 The formulation for the provision is 
                                                          
60 CA Paris, 3 March 1978, D.1978.IR.420. 
61 See Soinne “Identité ou diversité des notions de fictivité et de confusion des patrimoines” Petites 
Affiches (6-12-1995) 12. 
62 Cassation commerciale, 8 Feb 1994, Petites Affiches (24-05-1995) 33. 
63 a L. 651-1, Commercial Code. 
64 a L 653-4. 
65 a L 653-5. This provision contains elements in common with a L 654-2. 
66 a L 653-10. 
67 a L 653-8. 
68 Legeais (n 37) 1748. 
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certainly different from that usually found in the context of guarantees and notably the 
need to examine the disproportionality as between the amount of the guarantee and 
the assets and income of the guarantor.69 The text of the law of 2005 requires the 
comparison to be made between the amount of the loan and the amount of the 
guarantee. The text is also wider in its application because of the use of the word 
“guarantee”, as opposed to “security”, and its more extensive and inclusive meaning 
in law.70 This has the result of applying the concept of proportionality and the need to 
assess the guarantee by this standard, usually encountered where individuals deal with 
lenders to contracts hitherto excluded and notably contracts between directors of an 
incorporated debtor and the lender, by which the principle of limited liability is often 
avoided. Nonetheless, there are a number of problems with the text. The first is that it 
does not stipulate whether the comparison (between guarantee and loan amounts) is to 
be made at the time the loan is entered into or when the guarantee is called in, 
although Legeais thinks it likely that it is when the contract is first entered into in 
consideration for the lending being advanced to the debtor. Secondly, the text does not 
decide whether the comparison between the guarantee and the loan is to be made in 
function of the actual amount drawn down by the company or that notionally available 
to it. This worry is reflected in comments made on the CREDA website which point 
to the tendency in some quarters for loans to be made in return for open-ended 
guarantees covering the assets present and future of the borrower.71 The result may be 
that loans, especially to businesses in a “delicate situation”, may have to be made 
subject to ceilings being placed on the concomitant guarantees. Nevertheless, apart 
from valuation problems for difficult assets, a final problem remains in evaluating the 
possible disproportion of a guarantee where more than one guarantee is obtained in 
respect of the same lending transaction,72 when the issue will be whether the risk of 
recovery should be factored in to the decision as to any possible disproportionality. 
 
2.3.4 The impact on lender behaviour in France 
Lenders have often faced problems with perception and mistrust from the public, 
which applies equally to public perception of lenders in France.73 The role of the 
banks in the financial crisis just past, whose effects are still being felt today, has led to 
heightened public perceptions of the role they play in the functioning of economies. It 
is true that particularly in insolvency, the role of the lender is potentially ambiguous, 
given that the lender will be seeking the recovery of existing lending and the best 
position with respect to any later lending it gives so as to assist the potential for 
rescue. The curtailing of liability for improper support assists the clarification of what 
was a potential source of unease for lenders, particularly where the debtor was fast 
approaching the point of no return, when the (non-) availability of finance could result 
in rescue or annihilation. It does not, as feared by those opposing the introduction of 
the presumption of non-liability, represent a wholesale exculpation of all behaviour by 
lenders. It is unlikely that lenders will be any the less cautious in lending or indeed 
make the assessment of the prospect of recovery any the less important in their 
                                                          
69 a L 313-10 and L 341-4, Consumer Code. 
70 Legeais (n 37) 1749. 
71 Message posted by A. Reygrobellet (Chambre de Commerce et d’Industrie de Paris) on 20 Sept 2005 
at the Centre de Recherche sur le Droit des Affaires: www.creda.ccip.fr (no longer available). 
72 Legeais (n 37) 1749. 
73 See Watt “The spirit of insolvency in France” 1996 ICCLR 266. 
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calculations. In France, it is said that the law will not “excuse [lenders] from their 
duty to be vigilant or discriminating”.74  
Coupled with the protection for post-commencement financing in the context of 
conciliation, the effect may be to incite lenders to engage more in informal workouts 
with their debtors, safe in the knowledge that the advancement of further funds geared 
towards making rescue a realistic objective will not be unduly sanctioned. In fact, the 
law has strengthened the role of creditors in these workouts by expressly recognising, 
in 2010, a pre-pack version of preservation.75 Overall, the view may be formed that, 
while the principle of liability, as curtailed by the changes in 2005, sets the parameters 
of lender behaviour, it does not have a great impact on the vast majority of lending 
arrangements, but only on those where the closeness of the relationship between 
debtor and creditor can lead to either pressure being placed by the creditor on the 
scope of the debtor’s autonomy or there is a deliberate intention to flout the law. As 
such, the case law examples, while illustrative, do not represent the reality of the 
lending environment in France. 
 
3 The United Kingdom 
In the United Kingdom, a very different attitude to lenders has traditionally prevailed: 
the principle of pacta sunt servanda (agreements must be honoured). While in France, 
there are a number of mechanisms through which irresponsible lenders can be held to 
account, British lenders do not apparently suffer the same weight of responsibility to 
account for their behaviour with regard to a lending agreement short of those credit 
terms or actions which amount to extortion or fraud. Rather, debtors, whether 
individual or corporate, are generally expected to take responsibility for the 
agreements they enter into with creditors and to deal with the consequences of those 
agreements despite any advantage taken by creditors. 
 
3.1 Limited control over the consumer lending contract 
Only limited controls aimed at preventing fraud, extortion and in some cases 
unfairness are applied to consumer lending contracts in the United Kingdom. The 
applicable controls are contained in the main legislation dealing with consumer 
lending: the Consumer Credit Act 197476 and subsidiary legislation dealing with 
unfair terms in such contracts.77 Sections 140A-140D are a more recent formulation, 
having been inserted into the 1974 act in 2006,78 replacing repealed sections 137-140 
of the former act. The repealed section 137 formerly allowed courts to “reopen” 
agreements and rewrite terms, though this was limited to agreements valued at under 
£25 000 and applied to extortionate agreements only. Section 138 then defined 
extortionate as “grossly exorbitant” or otherwise in contravention of ordinary 
principles of fair dealing.79 In determining whether an agreement was extortionate 
under these sections, the court would look at facts, such as the prevailing interest rates 
compared to those applied in the agreement; the debtor’s age, experience, business 
capacity and health; whether or not the debtor was under financial pressure; the 
                                                          
74 Legeais (n 37) 1748. 
75 The “accelerated financial preservation” (sauvegarde financière accélérée) procedure, which was 
introduced by a 57-58, Law no. 2010-1249 of 22 Oct 2010. 
76 Notably s 140A-140D, Consumer Credit Act 1974. 
77 The Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations 1994 (SI 1994/3159). 
78 Consumer Credit Act 2006. 
79 This is language that is also picked up in s 244, Insolvency Act 1986 (1986 c 45), which introduces a 
statutory claw-back action in cases of extortionate credit transactions, defined in very much the same 
way. 
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creditor’s relationship to debtor; degree of risk to creditor having regard to value of 
security; and any other relevant considerations. In Falco Finance Ltd v Gough,80 the 
rate payable under a credit agreement rose by 5% for the remainder of a mortgage 
term if payments were even one day late. It was held that this term was extortionate in 
the credit bargain. However, in Ketley v Scott,81 an interest rate of 48% was not 
deemed extortionate as it was justified by the “extraordinary nature and urgency of 
transaction”. These circumstances were held to cover the terms contained in a typical 
bridging loan agreement. On the facts of this case, the court was not motivated to 
exercise its discretion to alleviate the terms of the interest rate owing to the deceit of 
the debtor in not revealing an existing mortgage. In another case, an increase of the 
compound interest rate from 20% to 40% on default occurring was not held to be 
extortionate, in this case because the parties were deemed to have entered into the 
bargain with eyes open and was by its very nature high risk. The fact that in White v 
Davenham Trust Ltd, the parties were also not dealing as consumers was also held to 
be relevant.82 
The provisions which replaced the repealed legislation do contain broader 
circumstances in which the court will intercede in a credit agreement, which also 
covers the extortionate conditions contained in the repealed sections. Section 140A 
states that a court can determine whether the relationship between the creditor and 
debtor is unfair based on the terms of the agreement or a related agreement; the way 
that the creditor has exercised or enforced its rights; and/or any other thing done or 
not done by the creditor in the context of the agreement or a related agreement. In 
making its decision on the fairness of a credit agreement and whether or not section 
140A should apply, the court will have regard to all relevant matters, including those 
matters relating to the characteristics of the creditor and the debtor. Section 140B 
grants the court power to require a creditor to repay amounts to the debtor; to return 
secured; or to refrain from doing certain acts. The court may also reduce the overall 
debt and even set aside the contract in its entirety or certain of its terms. The new 
sections 140A and 140B place no value limit on consumer lending contracts and allow 
agreements which are merely “unfair” to be amended or rewritten by the court. These 
amendments extend the liability of lenders well beyond those bargains deemed as 
extortionate under the 1974 act. The new sections do not go so far as to try to control 
lender behaviour through sanctions, but to broaden the circumstances in which the 
court can intervene in cases of unfairness. However, their biggest defect in serving as 
guidance to creditors as to the parameters of the lending arrangement is that they do 
not apply to corporate debtors, save where such a debtor is jointly liable together with 
an individual consumer.83 
 
3.2 The secured creditor’s responsibilities in receivership 
Receivership aims to give the creditor holding a qualifying form of security a priority 
right to the assets of a company and allows the creditor to seize them quickly. It is 
derived from land law, where historically a receiver of property was often appointed 
under a mortgage to take over the debtor’s chief asset, his land, so that it could be sold 
to repay the creditor what is owed. The mortgage contract would contain a clause 
stipulating that the lender had the right to appoint someone to enter onto land and 
recover it under specified conditions. However, where the land was used for a variety 
                                                          
80 (28 Oct 1999) Macclesfield county court (unreported). 
81 Ketley v Scott 1980 CCLR 137. 
82 2010 EWHC 2784 (Ch). 
83 s 185(5) of the Consumer Credit Act 1974. 
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of functions (growing crops; pasturing herd animals etc), it was usual to give the 
receiver the right not simply to take property into custody, but also to “manage” the 
property, in which case the title used was “receiver and manager”. In more modern 
times, as the property law practice became more widespread and used in commercial 
lending arrangements against all forms of property, receivers could be appointed in a 
variety of situations: under a fixed charge; under a “lightweight” floating charge over 
a small amount of a company’s assets; but, more usually, under a floating charge 
given as security under an instrument, often referred to as a debenture. 
In the Insolvency Act of 1986 formulation, which partially codified the practice of 
receivership (and incidentally retitling it administrative receivership), a floating 
charge would cover all or most of the company’s assets and would entitle the person 
appointed (known as the administrative receiver) to act. This person would usually be 
an insolvency practitioner. Receivers could also be appointed by the court if there was 
a defect in the underlying deed or if the powers of the court were required to compel 
the debtor. While the 2002 reforms largely abolished administrative receivership,84 
the procedure can still be used by creditors holding a qualifying floating charge 
created before the changes or in relation to those charges, whenever created, which 
fall within one of the specified exceptions.85 Law of Property Act 1925 receivers may 
still be appointed. The interest in examining receivership is that the rights flow out of 
the lending arrangement and have led to the discussion of liability on the part of the 
secured creditor, albeit in limited circumstances that revolve around the appointments 
process and liability for receivers’ actions. 
 
3.2.1 The appointments process 
Receivership normally commences when the debtor does something to trigger the 
appointment of a receiver by breaching one of the terms of the lending agreement. 
The floating charge is said at that point to “crystallise”. Typical triggers include 
default in interest payments; default in loan repayments subject to notice being given; 
default in maintaining gearing levels (referring to the ratio of debt to assets); default 
in maintaining the asset base by selling or dissipating assets; default in prudential 
management such as failing to insure property, over-paying directors or failing to 
carry out audits; or that the company has a petition for winding up, an administration 
order against it or a receiver has been appointed under another charge. Payment on 
demand is usual and the company need not be warned it is in danger of default. For 
example, in Cripps (Pharmaceuticals) Ltd v Wickenden,86 failure to pay within two 
hours of the due date was sufficient to allow the appointment of a receiver. In Bank of 
Baroda v Panessar, a demand for payment without stating the sum owed entitled the 
appointment of a receiver to be made one hour following the demand.87 However, a 
debenture holder must act in good faith in making the appointment of a receiver. In 
Downsview Nominees v First City Corporation, a floating charge holder of a New 
Zealand company appointed its controlling shareholder as receiver.88 The receiver 
subsequently behaved improperly, acting in the interests of the shareholders, rather 
                                                          
84 Enterprise Act 2002 (2002 c. 40). 
85 s250, which inserts a new s 72A, Insolvency Act 1986 creating the prohibition, subject to the 
exceptions listed in s 72B-GA. These include: capital market arrangements worth at least £50 million; 
public-private partnerships with step-in rights; utility projects with step-in rights; urban regeneration 
projects; project finance worth at least £50 million; (5) financial market arrangements; system-charges 
and collateral security charges; registered social landlords and protected railway companies. 
86 1973 2 All ER 606. 
87 1987 Ch 335. 
88 1993 AC 295. 
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than the debenture holder. The privy council found that, in addition to the receiver 
failing to act in good faith, the company also had not acted in good faith in appointing 
a receiver who had an interest in the company as a shareholder and allowing him to 
continue to act in a way contrary to his duty. 
In the United Kingdom,89 the requirement to appoint an insolvency practitioner 
would usually avoid the situation revealed in the Downsview case, as insolvency 
practitioners must have indemnity insurance90 and are bound by a professional code of 
conduct. Normally, however, financial lenders would ask for independent advice from 
an accountant or for an auditor’s report, before making an appointment. Occasionally, 
the accountant would be appointed the receiver, which carried with it the benefit of 
having prior knowledge of debtor’s affairs, but such an appointment could also lead to 
a possible conflict of interest. Generally, wrongful appointments of receivers were 
deemed to occur where: (1) the grounds for appointment were not properly specified 
in debenture; (2) the charge was invalid for lack of registration;91 (3) the charge was a 
preference;92 (4) the charge was granted while the company was insolvent and within 
the relation-back period;93 or (5) the charge was part of an extortionate credit 
transaction.94 Under the pre-Enterprise Act 2002 regime, floating charge holders 
would also lose their rights where an administration order had been issued before an 
appointment could be made.95 Some appointments could also be invalid if made while 
a petition for administration was awaiting a hearing, in which case the company might 
have a right of action against the receiver personally.96 However, receivers would 
normally ask for an indemnity from secured creditors as part of their conditions of 
appointment. In such cases, the court could force the debenture holder to bear any 
liabilities accrued by reason of the receiver’s invalid appointment.97 
 
3.2.3 Receivers’ actions 
The receiver principally acts on behalf of the interests of a secured creditor. However, 
the clause appointing the receiver usually deems him to be an agent of the debtor 
company,98 which effectively minimises the liability of the creditor making the 
appointment. As agent of the company, the administrative receiver has the same 
power as a director and can therefore gather in and deal with the company’s assets. 
The administrative receiver also benefits from limited liability as agent for the 
company and is therefore not personally liable for what he does on behalf of the 
company, unless the appointment is wrongful or he behaves contrary to professional 
etiquette. His limited liability is, however, subject to exceptions in the case of new 
contracts entered following his appointment and employment contracts. Nevertheless, 
an administrative receiver could be guilty of misfeasance under section 212 of the 
Insolvency Act 1986 and could also be disqualified in the same way as company 
directors can.99  
                                                          
89 Receiverships and the concept of the floating charge were extended to Scotland by the Companies 
(Floating Charges and Receivers) (Scotland) Act 1972. 
90 s 390(3) of the Insolvency Act 1986. 
91 s 874 of the Companies Act 2006. 
92 s 240 of the Insolvency Act 1986. 
93 s 245. 
94 s 244. 
95 s 11(3)(b)-(c). 
96 Windsor Refrigeration Co Ltd v Branch Nominees Ltd 1961 Ch 375. 
97 s 34 of the Insolvency Act 1986. 
98 s 44. 
99 Company Directors’ Disqualification Act 1986. 
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Normally, the company is vicariously liable for the acts of the receiver, unless he 
breaches the authority given by his appointment or the fiduciary duty generally owed 
by an agent to his principal. As such, the receiver is normally free to exercise 
commercial judgment with respect to the disposal of assets and is not obliged to wait 
for the best possible market conditions to sell them.100 However, the receiver does 
owe a duty to the mortgagor and guarantors of assets to take reasonable care to obtain 
the best possible price.101 There is, however, no general duty of care, a fact 
determined in the (previously mentioned) Downsview case where, in addition to the 
findings against the receiver and the company, the Privy Council said there was a 
general duty to act in good faith, but that the receiver did not owe a general duty of 
care. However, in Medforth v Blake, receivers were appointed over a pig farm with 
the power to manage, but when they failed to obtain commercial discounts on animal 
feed, the farmer sued them for mismanagement.102  The court of appeal held that it 
was a receiver’s decision whether to manage or to sell the farm as long as he fulfilled 
his primary duty to bring about a situation where a secured debt could be discharged. 
In this case, the receivers did not choose to take on the management duties. If 
receivers had chosen to manage the farm, they could not exclude a duty to manage 
with due diligence, which may have included the application for food discounts, 
breach of which may have rendered them liable to mismanagement. Determination of 
a receiver’s liability will also call into question the extent of the secured creditor’s 
responsibility as governed by the contract between them. 
 
3.3 Creditors’ responsibility in collective procedures 
The shift away from receivership moves the focus to whether liability arises by virtue 
of the lending contract in the arena of collective procedures. With the effective 
abolition of administrative receivership, secured creditors obtained the right to initiate 
administration proceedings and appoint their own administrator. Under the scheme 
introduced by the Enterprise Act 2002, the appointment of an administrator may be 
made by the court,103 at the request of the company or its directors104 as well as by the 
holder of a floating charge.105 The new purposes of administration as introduced by 
the 2002 act are firstly to rescue the company as a going concern and, where this is 
not possible, to do what is necessary to achieve a better result than would be available 
upon the liquidation of the company and finally, if these first two options are not 
possible, to realise property to make a distribution to the secured and preferential 
creditors.106 This final option functions as receivership did under the pre-Enterprise 
Act 2002 scheme. While a great many changes occurred to create an emphasis on 
corporate rescue under the Enterprise Act 2002 innovations, there appear to be no 
additional liabilities applied to secured creditors in relation to their responsibilities as 
lenders.  
The lack of liability under the Enterprise Act 2002 scheme could perhaps be 
explained on the basis that the receivership function and its attitudes have been 
                                                          
100 Cuckmere Brick Ltd v Mutual Finance Ltd 1971 Ch 949. 
101 American Express International v Hurley 1986 BCLC 52. There is also a general repugnance to 
allow asset sales to/appropriations by the creditor or associated parties, as decided in Tse Kwong Lam v 
Wong Chit Sen 1983 1 WLR 1349. 
102 Medforth v Blake 1999 2 BCLC 221. 
103 Insolvency Act 1986, sch B1, par 2, 10-13. 
104 par 22-34. 
105 par 14-21. 
106 par 3. 
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transferred or subsumed into the administration procedure. An exception is made in 
that the secured creditor may be required to indemnify any person against liability that 
might arise under a defective appointment of an administrator.107 Although there is no 
general duty of care owed by the administrator to creditors,108 which would serve to 
attract any vicarious liability on the part of an appointor, administrators are under an 
obligation to act in the collective interest and may be exposed to sanctions for 
misfeasance and liability for causing unfair harm to the interests of one or more of the 
creditors/shareholders.109 Whether these are sufficient bases on which to make an 
argument to expose the appointor to liability has not yet been decided. 
 
3.4  The impact on lender behaviour in the United Kingdom 
The lending environment in the United Kingdom has been as exposed to the global 
financial crisis as that in France. Yet, there does not seem to be any call for a 
generalised framework of responsibility, except in the loosest sense, that banker 
should have to justify why, in an age of austerity, the profits of lenders should be used 
to pay emoluments and remuneration far exceeding the perceived (and morally 
acceptable) norms for society. Only in the case of consumer lending has there been, 
historically, an acceptance of the need to regulate the content of the contract, though 
the limitation to non-corporate lending makes a generalised application of this 
principle impossible. The freedom to contract explains why the institution of 
receivership flourished till recently. This was despite the grave potential for conflict 
between the receiver’s appointment and obligation to the secured creditor to collect 
moneys with his behaviour while in charge of the company and any duty owed to the 
company as an agent). In cases of conflict, the question always was whose interest 
should prevail. This situation might may also be analysed in terms of liability: the 
secured creditor has little liability, while the company is liable for most things as the 
principal. Is this fair? One answer might be: it is a contract for lending and the parties 
are free to negotiate the terms; if the parties agree, then the consequences are also 
agreed. However, most lending is in the form of a standard contract with standard 
terms, so can companies really be said to be free to bargain? Despite these questions, 
there was, apart from the issue of possible wrongful appointments (essentially a 
breach of contract by the secured creditor) and perhaps some responsibility for a 
receiver’s actions, little appetite to open scrutiny of the lending arrangement, still less 
to institute a general principle of creditor’s liability. This attitude appears to inform 
the way in which administration has developed since the 2002 reforms giving the 
collective approach priority within the insolvency framework in the United Kingdom. 
 
SAMEVATTING 
This article does not pretend to offer a comprehensive overview of all of the creditor liability schemes 
and variations thereof that may exist throughout the world. The comparisons here are between two 
systems that may stand as exemplars of diametrically opposed views. Both systems depart from very 
different conceptions and bases for liability, though there are some limited similarities between both 
positions in the modern insolvency context, a convergence in modern European views towards 
insolvency law perhaps being noticeable here. In that light, the protection for post-commencement 
financing and a reluctance to hold creditors unnecessarily liable appears to be the modern European 
view. Although this does not represent too great a change to the traditional United Kingdom position, 
the introduction of these concepts has required a seismic shift in attitude by the French legislator, 
particularly given the historic approach to soutien abusif.  
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108 Kyrris v Oldham 2004 1 BCLC 305. 
109 Insolvency Act 1986, sch B1, par 74-75. 
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Further apparent similarities in both systems include the focus on vulnerable transaction rules and 
interference in management/shadow director status as generators of liability. However, in France, this 
focus is connected to attempts to revive the general liability rule by invoking participation in fraud 
(which includes most of the vulnerable transactions rules) and assumption of status as a shadow 
director. The creation of a generalised rule is a position the United Kingdom never reached in statute or 
the case-law. Although it appears harder in the United Kingdom to attach liability for banks as shadow 
directors,110 vulnerable transaction rules are often encountered in practice and serve the same 
restorative end to swell the debtor’s estate to enhance dividends to creditors. However, because both 
systems depart from different premises, the aim in the United Kingdom appears to be to elicit a 
contribution based on responsibility. Hence, the focus on consumer lending and responsibility for 
wrongful appointments and action by receivers and/or administrators as potentially involving some 
attribution of liability to creditors (usually the secured creditors responsible for such appointments). In 
the final analysis, there may be little commonalty between the positions these exemplars have reached.  
The question may be asked, though, whether there would be any merit in reviewing the similarities 
and differences between the systems with view to understanding if there is any international consensus, 
particularly within the European Union, for a measure that would generalise such a liability in the 
insolvency context. In fact, recent attempts by the European Union to kick-start again the company law 
harmonisation programme through the formulation of an Action Plan in 2012 have tended to focus on 
issues such as the management of risks, the duties of directors and their role in oversight as well as 
corporate social responsibility as a whole, thus placing the emphasis on prudential behaviour squarely 
within the province of individual companies. This suggests that debtors would largely be responsible 
for monitoring their own exposure to risks. This would tangentially deal with the debtor-creditor 
relationship as engaged through external contracting in the context of lending, creating and providing 
security as well as guarantees. Overall, the measures would seem to leave creditors unaffected to the 
extent that they do not pressure debtors to engage in unwarranted risk-taking. In the insolvency context, 
recent work on the reform of the European Insolvency Regulation has thrown up the question of 
whether the time has come to consider the achievability of substantive law reform and thus 
harmonisation of member states’ laws. Here too, apart from the specific issue of vulnerable 
transactions, which are also a topic on which work has been carried out by the UNCITRAL Working 
Group V  on Insolvency, there has been little that addresses the responsibility of creditors directly. 
Even more recently, the proposals emanating from the Commission Recommendation of 2014 mention 
only one form of liability that is connected to lending or that has potentially an application in the 
insolvency context. That is the withdrawal, in Recommendation 29, of protection for post-
commencement financing (or “new moneys”) in connection with the formulation of restructuring plans 
for small- and medium-sized enterprises in the event that fraud is encountered in connection with the 
provision of lending. It does not, however, detail whether there is any associated liability on the part of 
the parties involved, whether the debtor or creditor(s).  
For the moment, therefore, it seems as if the focus is more on regulating access to lending and 
encouraging prudential behaviour on the part of debtors and creditors with respect to risk-taking. Even 
in France, where such a principle exists, it is in practice carefully circumscribed by the lending contract 
and in the checks and balances that are inherent in the creditor’s assessment of the debtor’s capacity to 
borrow, a position that is incidentally reflective of practice in the United Kingdom. This may also 
explain why, in France, instances in the reported case law of liability are sparse. This convergence in 
the approaches of both jurisdictions to looking at the lending matrix, a position that is broadly 
representative of the general view in Europe, might also explain why any unified view of creditor 
liability may ultimately be off the agenda. 
                                                          
110 See the general discussion on parties that might be drawn into shadow directorships in Multinational 
Gas and Petrochemical Company v Multinational Gas and Petrochemical Services Ltd [1983] Ch 258. 
